Using data on 61 oil companies from 2001-09, we examine the evolution of revenue efficiency of National Oil Companies (NOCs) and shareholder-owned oil companies (SOCs). We find that NOCs generally are less efficient than SOCs, but their efficiency increased faster over the last decade. We also find evidence that partial privatizations increase operational efficiency, and (weaker) evidence that mergers and acquisitions during the decade tended to increase the efficiency of the merging firms. Finally, we find evidence that much of the inefficiency of NOCs is consistent with the hypothesis that government ownership leads to different firm objectives.
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Introduction
We examine a sample of 61 oil and gas firms to assess whether national oil companies (NOCs) were less revenue efficient than shareholder-owned oil companies (SOCs). The analysis reaffirms findings in Eller et al (2011) that NOCs tend to be less revenue efficient than SOCs. The longer time period examined in the current paper, however, also allows us to investigate how the relative efficiencies of NOCs and SOCs have changed in the last decade. This adds detail to our understanding of why some firms are less efficient than others and what types of changes may increase efficiency.
We examine revenue efficiency for several reasons. A previous theoretical paper (Hartley and Medlock (2008) ) argued that revenue is a key objective for both public and private firms. That analysis also suggested, however, that political pressure is likely to force a NOC to sell products to domestic consumers at subsidized prices. Physical output measures would not necessarily capture the effect of such subsidies. In addition, almost all of the firms in the industry produce a range of products from crude oil and natural gas to refined products. The natural way to aggregate these outputs is to measure their relative value at market prices, and hence take revenue as the output measure. Finally, and perhaps of greatest practical importance, for many firms revenue figures are more readily available than physical outputs of different commodities.
We suggest that investigating the efficiency of NOCs relative to SOCs is of interest for a number of reasons. First, NOCs represent the top holders of crude oil reserves internationally. For example, in the data set we examine herein, which includes the largest oil and gas firms in the world, fully government-owned NOCs reported more than 82% of the crude oil reserves of all firms in the sample in 2009. The six largest, and eight of the top 10 largest oil reserve holders are all fully government owned NOCs.
ExxonMobil is the only SOC in this group, at rank of nine in ten. As a result of their relatively large reserves, NOCs dominate global oil production and could be expected to 2 do so for some time to come. 1 If NOCs are less efficient than SOCs at producing marketable products from their vast reserves, we are likely to see lower oil production and higher oil prices than would be the case had the same resources been exploited by SOCs.
It may also be useful to understand why NOCs tend to be less efficiently managed than SOCs. As noted already, Hartley and Medlock (2008) argued that political pressure is likely to force NOCs to sell their products at below-market prices, but also to employ more workers than they really need. In effect, the firms are pressured into distributing resource rents to domestic consumers and workers, but in the process less value is obtained from the resources than would be the case were they exploited and sold at equivalent market prices. Once this dynamic is understood, governments or international organizations such as the World Bank may be in a better position to devise policies that can allow resource rents to be shared more efficiently.
In addition, a panel data set such as the one we investigate in this paper allows us to say something about how the relative efficiency of different firms has changed over time. We find that while oil and gas firms as a whole tended to become more efficient at producing revenue over the decade 2001-09, NOCs on average gained more than SOCs, generally moving closer to the revenue efficient frontier of the industry. We also find evidence that partial privatizations, along with mergers and acquisitions, are likely to result in increases efficiency. This is perhaps the very reason the privatizations, mergers or acquisitions occurred in the first place.
Finally, the comparison between particular NOCs and their NOC and SOC competitors may reveal something about how an inefficient NOC might be restructured to improve its efficiency. In particular, for any given inefficient firm the analysis reveals which efficient firms are most representative of the inefficient firm in terms of the operational variables.
This, in turn, allows us to identify which firms may be suitable models to emulate. Some 3 NOCs that are found to be as efficient as the major SOCs may also be suitable role models for governments wishing to improve the performance of their NOCs.
We use two methods to calculate revenue efficiency and changes in revenue efficiency:
non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) and parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). DEA constructs the revenue efficient frontier as a piecewise-linear outermost limit of the set of observed input-output bundles in each year and then measures the distance of firms from that frontier. SFA involves estimating a revenue frontier from observed input-output bundles, and measures inefficiency as a one-sided random error component in the multivariate regression surface. The fact that we find similar results using very different techniques adds to the confidence that the results reflect genuine differences between firms rather than artifacts of the estimation methodologies. 
Related literature
Despite the importance of NOCs in the world oil market, very few authors have examined the relative efficiencies of NOC's using formal econometric techniques such as DEA or SFA. Al-Obaidan and Scully (1991) used data for 44 firms in a single year, 1981, to construct a production frontier using both deterministic and stochastic methods. Specifically, they examined the ability of firms to use assets and employees to produce output, where output was defined as either revenue earned or the quantity of crude oil produced and processed. Relative to private firms, the authors found that NOCs are only 63% to 65% as efficient in generating revenue.
Although our results are generally consistent with those of Al-Obaidan and Scully, our study differs in many respects, particularly in the data used in the analysis. To begin, we use panel data in our analysis. We also include a broader set of oil companies than AlObaidan and Scully, who omit all OPEC nations arguing that the demonstrated efficiency 2 It should be noted that the intent of using a dual approach is not to compare the two methodologies; rather, we are seeking to make more robust statements about the relative revenue efficiencies of the included firms. 4 of those firms is "related more to the accident of geography than to the allocation of resources within the firm."
Our analysis can also be compared with two recent papers from the Electricity Policy Research Group at the University of Cambridge (Wolf (2008) and Wolf and Pollitt (2008) ). Like Eller et al (2011 ), Wolf (2008 He conducts a number of multivariate regression analyses with different dependent variables and two different types of estimators. In the latter regard, he considers a panel model with firm-specific intercept terms, and a total (or pooled ordinary least squares) estimator that ignores firm-specific heterogeneity in the data set. Wolf argues that the firm-specific intercept term in the fixed effects estimator captures "all (observed and unobserved) time-invariant variables" that affect the dependent variable.
Thus, all firms that do not change ownership over the sample period are treated identically regardless of their extent of government or shareholder ownership. On the other hand, while the total estimator permits an estimation of the (cross-sectional) effect of ownership on the dependent variable of interest, it cannot control for any firm-specific unobserved variables.
The SFA analyses conducted in Eller et al (2011) , and this paper, are also multivariate panel regression analyses, 4 but with a special assumed structure on the error terms. In particular, in the simplest form of SFA, the error terms are assumed to have timeinvariant firm-specific components drawn from a distribution that is strictly nonnegative.
There is also another component of the error, representing, for example, measurement error or omitted explanatory variables, that is assumed to have a symmetric distribution. World's Oil Companies," which is the source we used for the current paper. 4 SFA is a special type of random effects multivariate panel regression estimator. Wolf comments that he prefers the fixed effects panel estimator because the random effects estimator yields inconsistent results unless the firm-specific error terms are uncorrelated with the included measured variables. He rejects the latter hypothesis using a Hausman specification test. 5 Greene (2005) proposed a modification of the basic SFA model to allow for fixed or random effects to measure firm heterogeneity apart from the one-sided random inefficiency term. In Eller et al (2011) and the 5 By contrast, the standard random effects panel estimator, which implicitly assumes only symmetric error terms, ignores the differences in firm efficiency that will yield deviations from the most efficient firm. These differences will necessarily be one-sided.
Another difference between the analysis in Wolf (2008) and SFA is that theory imposes more structure on the estimated equation in SFA. In particular, as we discuss in more detail below, SFA directs one toward formulating a production function for the firm when choosing right hand side variables. By contrast, Wolf (2008) examines a range of dependent variables, none of which has a structural interpretation. This can make it difficult to specify the appropriate set of explanatory variables to include in the regression.
Of course, imposing more structure on the estimation could distort conclusions if the additional assumptions are inappropriate. That is a major motivation for also examining the relative efficiency of firms using non-parametric DEA. However, while DEA avoids making detailed assumptions about the underlying production function, it does not make allowance for measurement error or other sources of variation across firms that are unrelated to differences in inputs or relative efficiency.
Different from Wolf's analysis, but similar to that in Eller et al (2011) , the methods we employ require a balanced panel. In other words, we can only include firms in the data set if they have observations for all variables included in the analysis for all the years included in the data set. This ultimately reduces the number of years and firms in our data set.
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The paper by Wolf and Pollitt (2008) also is relevant to our current investigation. They focus on 60 share-issue privatizations by 28 former NOCs (from 20 different countries) analysis conducted below we estimate a parametric model where the firm-specific error component contains two terms (the time variable and government ownership share) that can be regarded as "inefficiency" effects and one term (a vertical integration measure) that is more appropriately regarded as a control for firm heterogeneity. 6 For example, including 2000 in addition to 2001-09 would have eliminated an additional 10 firms from our data including some important NOCs. By contrast, Wolf examines data from 1987-2006, but he has missing data for at least some of the variables for many firms in many years. 6 from 1977 to 2004. Many of these were follow-on offerings as government ownership shares were reduced in several steps. The NOCs included in their sample are predominantly from the more developed world (17 of the 28 are from OECD countries and none are from OPEC). The authors collected firm performance data 7 for seven-year periods surrounding each offering.
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They then compared mean performance three years prior to the asset sale to mean performance three years after the asset sale. They generally found that privatization is associated with higher profitability, improved operating efficiency, greater output and lower employment.
The authors also estimated a fixed effects panel data model allowing the intercept and the coefficient on "year" (a discrete variable ranging from 1-7 beginning 3 years prior to the privatization and ending 3 years after the asset sale) to differ before and after the privatization.
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They found that initial share-issue privatizations improved average performance by all measures, but the effect was statistically significant at the 10% level only for increased return on sales or assets and reduced employment per unit of assets.
The trend in performance was favorable for all metrics, and statistically significantly so at the 1% level for increased return on sales or assets, output per employee, output, and reduced employment per unit of assets. On the other hand, the trend after privatization was less favorable than the trend prior to privatization for seven out of ten indicators (although statistically significant only for returns on sales or assets). Wolf and Pollitt conclude that performance generally improves as a result of privatization but the improvements begin in anticipation of the subsequent share sale and, if anything, tend to slow down after the shares are sold.
7
The authors also examined the effects of follow-on share offerings subsequent to the initial privatization. The results were much less conclusive than for initial privatizations.
The only strong result was that continued reductions in government ownership were associated with continued reductions in employment -a finding that is consistent with some of the results we report below.
Victor (2007) return on assets, liquids and natural gas production relative to liquids and natural gas reserves (respectively), and revenue relative to production. However, these analyses are each one dimensional, raising the possibility of omitted variable bias in the estimated coefficients. They also are all conducted as simple regressions without any allowance for the possibility that constraints on the maximum level of efficiency that can be attained at any one time are likely to lead to asymmetric error terms.
Overview of methods
By definition, the observed input-output bundle of an efficient firm is on the production frontier, whereas an inefficient firm will be inside the production frontier. In our application, the output variable for firm i in year t, y it , is revenue in millions of current $US. The inputs, x ikt where k = 1…K, are oil (millions of barrels) reserves, natural gas (billions of cubic feet) reserves, distillation capacity (thousands of barrels per day), employees (head count at the end of the year), and oil (current $US per barrel) and natural gas (current $US per MMBTU) prices. These choices were motivated by the theoretical analysis of NOC behavior in Hartley and Medlock (2008) . Specifically, Hartley and Medlock (2008) assumed that current output Q of an oil-producing firm is given by
where L is labor input, Rsv is proved reserves, and G(E) represents geological limitations on field productivity that depend on the level of cumulative past exploitation, E.
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In its downstream operations, the firm uses labor and capital (especially refining capacity) along with crude and wellhead natural gas to produce marketable products q, such that
Revenue will then be given by
for a vector of product prices p and corresponding percentage subsidies s on each marketable product. While the relative prices of the different products will vary, they will be cointegrated with crude oil prices, so we simply used the latter herein as a proxy for all the relevant oil product prices.
As already noted, we use both DEA and SFA to determine the technological frontier and the distance of firms from that frontier. DEA uses linear programming techniques to construct a non-parametric piecewise-linear convex hull of observed input-output bundles.
The DEA efficiency scores can then be used to measure changes in efficiency from one year to the next. Specifically, we calculate the Malmquist indices of total factor productivity changes for each firm in the sample. SFA involves estimating a parametric production frontier from observed input-output bundles using panel data estimation techniques adapted for this problem.
As noted above, an advantage of DEA relative to SFA is that it requires no assumptions regarding the functional form of the production technology, and it is not subject to the potential problems of assuming an inappropriate distribution of the error term. However, 10 The maximum annual output Q obtainable from a given level of proved reserves is bounded by an amount that will depend on geological factors such as reservoir pressure and porosity. Over time, enhanced recovery techniques may be required to keep older reservoirs producing. In addition, reservoirs that are easier to exploit are likely to be mined first. We do not have any data on the geological characteristics or the average age of the reservoirs exploited by the different firms. These factors, therefore, are likely to be significant components of the error terms in the models that we subsequently estimate using SFA. 
The data set
As in Eller et al (2011 ), Victor (2007 and Wolf (2008) , the primary data source was the Energy Intelligence annual publication "Ranking the World's Oil Companies". However, we also consulted company annual reports to check and revise some of the published data and to provide missing data.
11 Recent econometric literature has attempted to bridge the gap between the DEA and SFA by introducing statistical noise into DEA or by using a non-parametric formulation for inefficiency in SFA. Grosskopf (1996) provides an early survey of literature on statistical inference in DEA models. Desai et al. (2005) modified the constraints in DEA so they only needed to hold probabilistically. Tsionas (2003) discusses using DEA estimates of efficiency as priors for the one-sided errors in an SFA model, which then are derived as posterior estimates in a Monte Carlo Bayesian analysis.
We began with almost 150 firms, but, as noted above, the methods that we use require a balanced panel so a firm missing just one variable in one year had to be dropped from the sample. This constrained both the number of years and the number of firms we could include in the data set. In addition, to obtain measures for all variables for each firm in the sample, for firms that merged we combined the inputs and revenues of merger partners in years prior to the merger. This further reduced the number of separate firms in the sample. To keep track of the "synthetic" firms so formed, we defined an indicator variable (Premerge) that was set to 1 in the years before the firms merged and to zero in 12 Table 1 lists the averages of key variables for each company in the sample. As already noted, revenue is the output variable, while oil and natural gas reserves, refining capacity and employees are production inputs.
We also used data on oil and natural gas prices from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). We used the average annual US import oil price for North American firms, the average annual OPEC oil price for OPEC members, and the average non-OPEC oil price for other firms in the sample.
For natural gas prices, we used the average annual prices at the Henry Hub for North American firms, average annual Japanese LNG import prices for firms in Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East, EU pipeline import prices for firms predominantly selling in Europe, and EU LNG import prices for LNG exporting firms in the Atlantic Basin. 
Analysis
Data envelopment analysis
We used the program DEAP 2.1 written by Tim Coelli to calculate the DEA measures.
We assumed that the technology displays constant returns to scale. While an assumption of variable returns to scale allows for wider variations in technologies across firms allowing more firms to be measured as efficient, the assumption of variable returns also renders firms more difficult to compare.
DEA solves the following linear programming problem. Suppose we have N firms each using K inputs to produce a single output. It is useful for the subsequent discussion to briefly explain the idea behind this linear programming problem. Imagine forming a weighted average of existing firms, referred to below as a "composite firm," to be compared with firm i with λ j being the weight of firm j in this composite.
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The composite firm uses inputs Xλ at most equal to the inputs x i used by firm i while producing output Yλ at a minimum equal the output y i of firm i. A 14 While the concept is defined for multiple outputs as well as multiple inputs, we will only be considering a uni-dimensional output, namely revenue. 15 If we assume the technology has constant returns to scale then the composite firm can be compared with a re-scaled version of firm i and the λ weights need not sum to one. If we cannot assume constant returns to scale, the composite firm needs to match a full-sized copy of firm i and the weights λ need to sum to 1. firm i that is efficient would have θ = 1 and all components of λ except for the i-th one equal to zero while λ i = 1. If a value θ > 1 can be found for firm i, however, then that firm is not efficient and θ measures how much firm i has to increase its output to become efficient. In addition, if the composite firm would use strictly less of some inputs than does firm i (that is, x i -Xλ ≥ 0 is non-binding for some inputs), firm i also is inefficient in the sense that it could produce the same output using less of these particular inputs. years they were fully government owned and in the SOC group in any year they were fully privatized. The remaining firms in the pNOC category in each year therefore had government ownership shares strictly between 0 and 1. We have also included the average government ownership share in these firms for each year of the sample as well as the average across all years. In most years, the average DEA efficiency score for pNOCs lies between that of the We can obtain more systematic evidence on the relationship between government ownership and the DEA efficiency score by regressing the annual scores of each firm against the government ownership share in the same year. In doing so, however, we need to account for the fact that the DEA efficiency score is, by definition, bounded above by 1. 16 We therefore estimate a Tobit regression model, which takes the truncation into account by assuming that an observation of 1 for the dependent variable merely tells us that the error term is bounded below by an observed value. In addition, the panel nature 16 The DEA score is truncated at 1 for 167 out of 549 observations. of the data needs to be taken into account. Specifically, we expect there to be firmspecific effects, such as the geological or market conditions that a firm faces, that are unmeasured and many of which are likely to be constant or nearly constant over the sample period. Thus, the panel Tobit model assumes that the dependent variable (the DEA score in our case) satisfies We examined several models. In the basic specification, we allowed both the intercept and time trend to depend on the actual government ownership share (GovShare). We also 
17 In a model that includes the amount of government ownership and its interaction with year along with categorical variables for GovShare =1 (NOC) and 0 < GovShare < 1 (pNOC) and their interactions with year, the coefficients on GovShare, year and GovShare*year are individually not statistically significantly different from zero and a test for the joint significance has a p-value of 0.7904. Furthermore, after dropping these variables, a test for equality of the coefficients on NOC and pNOC had a p-value of 0.4466, while a test for equality of the coefficients on the interactions NOC*year and pNOC*year had a p-value of 0.8963. Finally, the log likelihood for the estimated model (6) Systematic factors apart from the government ownership share could also be expected to affect the efficiency score. In particular, we noted when discussing the data that we constructed a variable Premerge that took the value 1 for firms that subsequently merged and was set to zero for years following a merger or for firms that were not involved in a merger during the sample period. If mergers increase efficiency we would expect
Premerge to negatively affect the DEA score.
As we also noted above, the theoretical model of NOC behavior considered by Hartley and Medlock (2008) emphasized that political pressure is likely to force a NOC to sell products to domestic consumers at subsidized prices. We thus would expect measured inefficiencies to be systematically related to the presence of retail fuel subsidies. We tested for this possibility by including a variable RetSubs. This took the value zero for countries with average retail prices of gasoline and diesel above those of the US (including the US itself) while for countries where the average retail prices were lower than in the US, the extent of subsidy was measured by the percent deviation below the US average in the same year.
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18 Retail gasoline and diesel fuel prices were obtained from the Metschies surveys of international fuel prices. Since the Metschies data is biennial, we used the average of the two percentage subsidies from the two adjacent years to proxy the percentage subsidy in the missing years. In Eller et al (2011), we used the Finally, while we included refinery capacity among the inputs, firms with large retail operations would also have substantial capital invested in those operations that are not measured among the inputs. Such firms might then artificially appear more efficient. We therefore also defined a variable VertInt equal to the ratio of product sales (in thousands of barrels per day) to annual liquids production (also measured in thousands of barrels per day) to measure the extent to which the firm is involved in downstream markets.
Once again, the best model grouped NOCs and pNOCs together with a common trend in DEA efficiency score and did not yield a significant trend in the DEA score for SOCs: Premerge it  0.0157
The coefficients on score that is only about 6.6% below the average for corresponding SOCs.
same data but coded the subsidy variable 0-1 to indicate whether the country had an average gasoline and diesel price below the corresponding average of the two prices in the US. 19 Estimating a model that includes GovSharei, year and their interactions along with NOC and pNOC and their interactions with year, the coefficients on GovShare, year and GovShare*year are individually and jointly insignificantly different from zero (p-value 0.8845). Furthermore, after dropping these variables, a test for equality of the coefficients on NOC and pNOC had a p-value of 0.8487, while a test for equality of the coefficients on the interactions NOC*year and pNOC*year had a p-value of 0.6031. Finally, the log likelihood for the estimated model (7) is -18.4300 compared to -21.0310 for a model that includes GovShare and GovShare*year as regressors in place of the first two regressors in (7). 20 As we note below, however, the remaining variables in the regression are unlikely to be the same for SOCs relative to NOCs and pNOCs.
The coefficient on RetSubs in (7), which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, also implies that operating in a country where retail prices are subsidized, which overwhelmingly applies to NOCs and pNOCs, also substantially reduces estimated revenue efficiency. Specifically, the mean retail price in these countries is about 40% below US retail price. On average, therefore, such subsidies reduce the estimated revenue efficiency for firms headquartered in subsidizing nations by almost 15% below the average shareholder firm operating in an environment without such subsidies.
The coefficient on Premerge in equation (7) also is significantly different from zero at a better than 1% level. It implies firms that undertake mergers have a joint DEA efficiency score in the years before they merge that is more than 15% below the average score of 0.8640 for SOCs. Thus, mergers tend to be efficiency improving.
Finally, at the mean of strictly positive values of VertInt of 1.74, the effect on the estimated DEA score is about 0.027. However, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level. This might be attributed to the inclusion of refining capacity among the inputs in the calculation of the DEA scores substantially adjusting for the effects of relatively high participation in downstream markets.
Apart from the efficiency scores  the DEA linear program also produces a matrix of coefficients  . These give the linear combinations of efficient firms that yield superior performance to each of the inefficient firms in each year. More specifically, the non-zero values of  ijt give the weights on efficient firms j in year t that would result in a composite efficient firm using no more inputs while producing at least as much revenue as inefficient firm i. Some firms that contribute to dominating composite firms in some years (most especially CNOOC in 2009) do not do so in other years because they are not themselves on the frontier in those years. In other cases, such as ExxonMobil, the firm is on the frontier in every year but does not play prominent role contributing to dominating composite firms perhaps because its input mix differs too substantially from that of the inefficient firms.
Malmquist index measures of productivity change
Instead of comparing firm i with other firms operating in the same year one could ask how efficient firm i would have been had it used x it-1 to produce y it-1 while the comparison firms used year t technologies in year t-1. Modifying notation slightly, let D t (y it-1 , x it-1 ) denote the latter quantity and D t-1 (y it-1 , x it-1 ) the original DEA measure in year t-1. The ratio of these distance functions
measures productivity growth in firm i from year t-1 to year t viewed from the perspective of the set of technologies available in year t.
We could also measure the productivity gain from year t-1 to year t from the perspective of the technologies available in year t-1. Thus, the DEA measure of firm i efficiency if it had generated revenue y it from inputs x it while the comparison firms only had access to year t-1 technologies would be written D t-1 (y it , x it ). The productivity gain from year t-1 to year t then also could be measured as:
The Malmquist index is then defined as the geometric mean of these two measures:
Equation (10) can also be written as the product of two components:
The first ratio (outside the square brackets) is the so-called efficiency change, and measures movements towards the frontier from year t-1 to year t by firm i. This can be obtained from the annual DEA measures graphed in Figure 1 above.
The first ratio in square brackets in (11) measures the proportional change in the efficient frontier at the data observed for firm i in period t-1, while the second ratio measures the change in the frontier at the data observed for firm i in period t. The geometric average of these two ratios, called a measure of technical change, thus measures the change in frontier technology between the two periods for the parts of the frontier relevant for firm i. In interpreting Figure 3 , it is useful to focus first on the firms that are on the frontier every year, namely Wintershall, Marathon, ExxonMobil, BP, BHPBilliton, StatoilHydro, Sinopec and PTT (Figure 1) . These firms will play the major role in shifting the frontier from t-1 to t.
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Observe that the technical change measure can be written as:
21 Firms on the frontier in just one of the two successive years will also generally influence the shape of the frontier in that year, but will have no effect on the shape of the frontier in the year they are off it.
Figure 3: Technical change measures relevant for each firm in successive years
For firms on the frontier in both periods, the ratio in the denominator in (12) will be 1 and the deviation of the technical change measure from 1 will reflect the ratio in the numerator of (12). If the industry is undergoing positive technical progress, 22 a frontier firm i in year t-1 allowed to use x it to produce y it when other firms are using year t-1 technologies ought to remain on the frontier, that is, we should find D t-1 (y it , x it ) = 1. Even if firm i is also on the frontier in year t, however, it might not be able to stay there using
x it-1 to produce y it-1 when other firms are using year t technologies and we could find
23 Thus, the ratio in the numerator in (12) measures for Sinopec are not much more dispersed than those for ExxonMobil, but their average is substantially above 1. The implication is that, although Sinopec was on the frontier each year it had to make changes to remain there. If it had not changed its inputs and output it would have fallen below the frontier. 22 Since we are measuring revenue efficiency, higher prices for refined products relative to crude, for example, would result in measured "technological progress" even if "technology" narrowly interpreted is unchanged. 23 When this happens, the "shape" of the convex hull that describes the production frontier is changing over time. 24 Since Wintershall and BHPBilliton are often in composite frontier firms dominating the inefficient firms (see Figure 2) , they must have input combinations comparable to many other firms. Thus, when their inputs and output are lagged one year it also is easier to find a composite of other firms that can dominate them.
For firms that are not on the frontier in both t-1 and t, it makes more sense to view the technical change measures in Figure 3 using the original expression on the right hand side of (11), which gives the technical change measure as the product of two ratios. The first ratio measures D t-1 relative to D t at (y it-1 , x it-1 ) while the second measures D t-1 relative to D t at (y it , x it ). If either of these ratios exceeds 1, the frontier at t shifts out relative to the frontier t-1 at the observed input and output proportions of firm i in either t-1 or t.
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The average of all the technical change measures in Figure 3 across both years and firms is 1.129, implying that on average the frontier expanded over the decade. The ratio of distance measures for firm i in t-1 and t equals the ratio of distance to the frontier at t to the distance to the frontier at t-1 along a ray determined by firm i input proportions. Thus, a technical change measure exceeding 1 will indicate an expanding frontier at the ray relevant for firm i, implying that if the DEA scores remained the same in t-1 and t then firm i actually became more productive and thus M > 1. 26 This is separate from the results found above that the DEA scores also increased on average, implying that firms got closer to the (shifting) frontier, over the decade. We also examined some panel regression relationships for the technical change and overall Malmquist productivity change measures. Since these measures relate to changes from one year to the next we checked for systematic relationships with changes in the ownership, retail subsidy, merger and vertical integration variables we examined as possible explanatory variables for the annual DEA scores.
For the technical change measure, none of the proposed explanatory variables was statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 27 A panel regression for the
Malmquist total productivity change measures yielded:
28
Malmq it  1.163
where Δ is the time difference operator. The coefficients in (13) imply that mergers and a reduction in retail fuel subsidies both raise total productivity. This is consistent with the results for the annual DEA measures in (7) that mergers raise DEA scores, while higher subsidies are associated with lower DEA scores. The fact that VertInt and none of the GovSh measures proved significant (and were thus dropped from (13)) is also consistent with the earlier results. In particular, note that although GovSh + was significant in the DEA regression, a partial privatization would change GovSh = 1 to 1 > GovSh > 0, so the 27 The change in merger variable came closest to being so, with a coefficient of 0.1017 and a p-value of 0.129. This variable would be zero except for the year when a merger occurred when it would take the value -1. A positive sign of the coefficient would imply that mergers tend to take the "synthetic" premerged firms to a part of the production space where the frontier is closer. 28 The coefficient on Retsubs has a p-value of 0.014, while that on Premerge has a p-value of 0.004. When we also included changes in GovSh, and VertInt as regressors, the coefficients on Retsubs and PreMerge remained significant at the 3% and 1% levels respectively, while neither of the other variables was significant at even the 30% level. Equation (13) The lack of significance of GovSh in (13) therefore supports the conclusion from the DEA measures that partial government ownership has the same effect on efficiency as full government ownership.
Stochastic frontier analysis
The second approach that we use to measure relative revenue efficiency is a parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). 30 Suppose we can use a single output production function for a cross-section of N firms with K inputs to be given as
where i = 1, 2, …, N. If the production technology can be represented as Cobb-Douglas, taking natural logarithms of the production function yields the linearized form 0 1 ln ln
where v i is a stochastic component reflecting measurement error or omitted variables 29 Thus, GovSh + would only be non-zero in the very small number of instances where government ownership was eliminated entirely. 30 We primarily used the program FRONT 4.1 also written by Tim Coelli for the stochastic frontier analysis. 31 In the analysis presented below, we assume that v i is normally distributed and u i is a truncated normal distribution multiplied by a specific function of time. Pitt and Lee (1981) extended the maximum likelihood approach for estimating firmspecific technical efficiency to panel data.
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The log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function for panel data is 0 1 ln ln
for years t = 1, …, T and where the efficiency component u i can depend in a parametric way on time or other measured covariates, but for u i to be identified it cannot have an arbitrary time dependence.
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In the simplest specification, we assume: In our case, y it is the revenue of firm i in year t, and based on equations (1) Schmidt and Sickles (1984) also proposed using one-sided fixed-effects and random-effects to measure time-invariant producer-specific technical efficiency. See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for a thorough survey of panel stochastic frontier analysis. 33 The time-varying specifications we shall examine were first proposed by Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) , and Coelli (1992, 1995) . 34 Since some firms had no distillation capacity we actually used ln(1+capacity), which is zero for capacity equal to zero and barely changed from ln(capacity) when capacity is positive since the average of the strictly positive values is around 1000 (in thousands of barrels per day). 
The strong positive correlation between the measures for each firm is also illustrated in An indication of which components of the DEA inefficiency measures are also present in the SFA measures can be obtained by re-estimating equation (7) with the SFA efficiency score as an additional control variable. Specifically, if a formerly significant explanatory variable is no longer significant when the SFA scores are included, we can conclude that the SFA score accounts for the effects of that variable on the DEA inefficiency measure.
The results indicated that the one-sided SFA efficiency error components capture a substantial fraction of the systematic effects of GovSh Some components of the DEA inefficiency scores may not be present in the SFA scores because they could instead affect the estimated revenue function. This is particularly so for the retail subsidy variable, which was calculated as the percentage discount on retail fuel prices below the corresponding US prices, and set to zero when prices were greater than or equal to the US prices. We would expect (1-RetSubs) to multiply the oil price in producing revenue and therefore ln(1-RetSubs) should be included in the estimated revenue function rather than the error term.
Similarly, a major conclusion of the theoretical analysis of NOC behavior by Hartley and Medlock (2008) was that the relative inefficiency of NOCs is likely to be manifest in substantial over-employment. Equivalently, this should show up as a reduced productivity of labor in NOCs. If this hypothesis is valid we should also expect to find an interaction term between GovSh and lnEmp in the estimated revenue function (16). With these considerations in mind, we estimated a revised SFA model that included GovShare*lnEmp and ln(1-RetSubs) in the estimated revenue function and allowed for a structural model of the one-sided inefficiency component of the error term using the specification of Battese and Coelli (1995) . This specification allows the mean of the firmspecific inefficiency measures u it to depend on firm-specific covariates z lit , where
The random variable w it in (18) The estimated revenue function (19) also implies that oil prices have a larger effect on revenue than natural gas prices, 37 but natural gas reserves have a larger effect than oil reserves. The latter result may suggest that firms on average tend to hold more excess oil than natural gas reserves. The efficiency differences due to retail price subsidies, like the reduced productivity of labor as a result of government ownership, remain throughout the sample period.
The positive coefficient on refining capacity in the revenue function (19) implies that selling refined products enables the firm to generate more revenue. Even if the firm does not have refining capacity, the negative, and quite large, 38 coefficient on VertInt (the ratio of liquid product sales to liquids production, both measured in physical terms) in (20) implies that firms with more downstream operations will make more revenue relative to the inputs that have been measured in (19). This result could represent firm heterogeneity rather than measured inefficiencies per se.
Conclusion
We used two very different methods to examine changes in the revenue efficiency of 61 oil and gas firms over the period 2001-09. The sample included national oil companies (NOCs), partially privatized national oil companies (pNOCs) and shareholder owned oil companies (SOCs). The methods we used were non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) and associated Malmquist measure of annual productivity changes, and a parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
Despite the very different nature of the methods, they produced similar results. In particular, the two sets of relative inefficiency measures were highly correlated. We also found strong evidence that efficiency of the group of firms increased over the decade, but 37 If the revenue function (19) represents a Cobb-Douglas production function times output prices as hypothesized, we would expect the right hand side to be homogeneous of degree 1 in the nominal prices. Although the coefficients on lnOilp and lnNGP do not sum to 1, these variables measure the actual output prices with error, so the coefficient estimates may be biased toward zero. 38 At the mean of the variable of 1.1524, the effect is around 14% higher than the constant term in (20) .
that NOCs and pNOCs tended to improve at a faster rate. Nevertheless, a gap between the SOCs and the other firms was still present at the end of the decade.
Both methods also showed that retail subsidies were a major source of reduced revenue efficiency for many NOCs and pNOCs. The SFA also revealed that government ownership tends to encourage over-employment, or equivalently a reduced productivity of labor. This effect was reduced by partial privatization. On the other hand, the SFA analysis also revealed an additional residual negative impact of government ownership that was not affected by partial privatization. This latter unidentified source of relative inefficiency tended to disappear over the decade.
There were some subtle differences between the two types of analyses that bear mention.
For one, the DEA and Malmquist analyses also found evidence that mergers tended to raise the efficiency of the merging firms, but we did not find a similar effect in the SFA.
Secondly, the SFA, but not the DEA, analysis revealed that a larger ratio of product sales to liquids production leads to increased revenue ceteris paribus. This is a plausible result since we did not include any capital assets associated with retail operations among the inputs. It is unclear why the DEA analysis did not reveal as strong an effect from this Among the five large international SOCs, ExxonMobil stood out by not only being on the frontier in every year but also by having an efficiency measure on or close to the frontier even if its inputs and revenue were lagged one year relative to the remaining firms in the sample. Of the five large SOCs, only BP plays a prominent role in forming part of the composite firms that can be shown to dominate the inefficient firms. In that sense, it makes a more feasible firm for the inefficient firms to emulate. The most common member of such dominating composite peers, however, was the German firm Wintershall.
Other firms frequently present in such composites included StatoilHydro, EnCana, BHPBilliton and Marathon. Among the few NOCs that appear on the frontier in any year, only SaudiAramco has a noticeable presence in any dominating composite peer firms.
Even then, it is a small part of a composite dominating firm that inefficient firms should try to emulate.
Finally, as we noted in the introduction, the evidence supports the notion that the government overseers of NOCs tend to redistribute resource rents toward both domestic consumers and domestic employees of the firm. As a result, as NOCs control more global oil and gas resources it is reasonable to expect that an increasing majority of oil and gas developments will be undertaken with political objectives in mind. This may result in less production and higher prices than would occur under commercial development. The results also support previous findings that even partial privatizations can increase the efficiency of NOCs, presumably by limiting the ability of politicians to interfere with operating decisions and by requiring the firms to adhere to the accounting and other commercial practices of SOCs. 
